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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




Case No. 18989 
PAUL FJELDSTED dba FJELDSTED 
OIL COMPANY, ) 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT - APPELLANT 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appeallant seeks a reversal of the Judgment of 
the District Court awarding damages to the Plaintiff on a 
open account; and a remand of the case to the District Court 
for re-trial of the properly admitted evidence. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Defendant-Appellant had a long-standing open account 
with Plaintiff-Respondent. Defendant purchased petroleum 
- 1 -
products from Plaintiff, a wholesale distributor. PL:iint iff 
brought suit for payment related to three (3) invoices for 
purchases of petroleum products by the Defendant. These in-
invoices were unsigned and Defendant denies ordering, acknowledginu 
or receiving delivery. Plaintiff introduced as an exhibit a 
delivery ticket allegedly made out by the company from whom 
Plaintiff purchased the petroleum products and by whom they 
were allegedly delivered to Defendant. Defendant objected to 
this exhibit and appeals from the trial court's failure to 
exclude this exhibit and the judgment based thereon. Reference 
made herein to evidence given at trial is made by transcript 
page numbers, eq. T-1. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Appellant owns and operates a retail outlet 
for petroleum products. Plaintiff-Respondent is a corporation 
which among other things distributes petroleum 
products on a wholesale basis to retailers such as Defendant, 
(T-7, 32, 34). Defendant has had a long standing open account 
with Plaintiff and has made numerous purchases of petroleum 
products from Plaintiff on credit, (T-11. 34). Defendant 
- 2 -
·"1"c•J monthly billings on this account from Plaintiff. 
f 1,,·J c;ded in this billing statement were the invoices evidencing 
individual purchases, (T-9). Defendant made payments to 
Plaintiff on this account and it was stipulated by the parties 
thut the unpaid balance of this account was directly attributable 
to four (4) invoices, one of which was later disallowed as 
, '"d claim, (T-3, 43). The issue at trial was whether the 
products listed in the three (3) remaining invoices were 
actually delivered to and received by Defendant, (T-3). 
Defendant testified that the majority of the purchases made 
from Plaintiff were picked up and transported by Defendant, 
IT-36, 37). However the disputed invoices were for purchases 
which were neither delivered by Plaintiff nor picked up by 
Defendant; but rather were delivered allegedly by a third 
)!arty, Metro Oil Products, (T-19, 27). The dates of these 
were January 30, 1980; March 15, 1980 and April 17, 
1'381, (T-15, 19, 21). 
Plaintiff's president, Erval Hansen, testified at trial 
there was no specific order placed by Defendant for 
these purchases, but that due to the prevailing shortages of 
petroleum products at the time, there was a standing order for 
- 3 -
all the gas and diesel that Pla1nl1tt cu1ild qct, (T-'41. 
Defendant testified that no such deliveries WPrr ever made 
and in fact Plaintiff's invoices for these alleqed purchases 
were unsigned, (T-37, 38, 39). As proof of actual delivery 
Plaintiff sought to introduce a document identified as a 
"delivery ticket" prepared totally by the afore-mentioned 
third party, Metro Oil Products. This ticket purports ro 
evidence that a Metro Oil Products tanker truck delivered the 
March 15, 1980 purchase of 9,000 gallons of diesel, (T-19, 27) 
Defendant objected to this exhibit, Exhibit #5, on the grounds 
that it had been wholly prepared by a third party and that 
insufficient foundation had been laid for its admission, (T-27). 
The trial court overruled this objection upon the grounds that 
said delivery ticket was received in the regular course of 
Plaintiff's business, (T-27). 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Does a writing, offered as a memorandum of facts and occur-
rences, which has been totally prepared by a third party who 
is neither an agent nor employee of the profferring party; but 
rather a totally separate and distinct business entity, qualify 
- 4 -
a11 except i un to the general hearsay rule of evidence; and 
i I it does is the profferring party competent to testify as 
t<> its preparation and trustworthiness as required by the 
business record exception. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION 
DERIVES ITS VALUE AND CREDITBILITY FROM A THIRD 
PARTY AND AS SUCH IS HEARSAY. 
The evidence in question is a so-called delivery ticket 
prepared totally by Metro Oil Products, a third party who 
is neither involved in this lawsuit nor was called to testify 
as a witness at trial. The ticket purports to substantiate 
one of the alleged deliveries listed in the disputed invoices. 
There is no question that as a statement made by a third party, 
out of court, and related or introduced as evidence by a 
witness at trial, this evidence is hearsay, as as such is 
i11admissable under Utah law, State in Interest of K.D.S., 578 
P.2d 9 (Utah 1978); Butler v. Butler, 23 u. 2d 259, 461 P.2d 
727 (1969); Richards v. Lake Hills, 15 U.2d 150, 389 P.2d 66 
- 5 -
(1964); John C. Cutler Asso_c_._, ,- _ ,,, '-' 
101, 279 P.2d 700 (1955); "·_'•lri1••l_1i, 
267 P. 2d 759 (1954); Savage v. Nielse_n, lH 11. 2.', l'J7 I• JcJ 
117 (1948); see also 29 Am. Jur. 2J 'i'; 4'JJ, (,()CJ. 
The fact that the evidence is in written form and is 
offered as an exhibit does not overcome this defect, 29 Am. 
Jur. 2d 498, 834, 881. 
In order to properly admit this exhibit into evidence 
the trial court must have necessarily held that it qualified 
as one of the enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule, 
Rule 63 Utah Rules of Evidence. More particularly subsection 
(13) of Rule 63. 
POINT II 
THE BUSINESS RECORD EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY 1.tlLE 
DOES NOT EXTEND TO RECORDS THAT ARE PREPARED BY p, 
THIRD PARTY WHO IS NEITHER AN EMPLOYEE NOR AGLl'T 
OF THE PROFFERING PARTY. 
There is an obvious distinction between the of writinq 
which is intended to be covered by the business recc1rcl excC'ptio-
to the hearsay rule, Rule 63, Utah Rul0s of Evidence' suLsecl inn 
(13), and the type of writing which is dt issue in tl11s cas». 
- h -
I'), 1 dist inrt i<>n 1 s one of authorship or preparation. The first 
1 writinq, offered as a memorandum of facts or occurrences 
i":olved in the case, which has been prepared internally by 
the business entity proffering said writing as an exhibit at 
trial. The second is a writing, offered as a memorandum of 
facts and occurrences, which has been totally prepared by a 
and distinct business entity from that which seeks to 
introduce said writing as evidence at trial. The plain and 
clear language of Rule 63 (13) U.R.E. unquestionably deals 
with only those internal business records which are made 
by the business entity proffering such writings at trial. 
Rule 63 (13) U.R.E. states: 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE EXCLUDED--EXCEPTIONS 
Evidence of a statement which is made other than 
by a witness while testifying at the hearing offered 
to prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay 
evidence and inadmissible except: 
(13) Busines3 Entries and the Like. Writings 
offered 1s memoranda or records of acts, conditions 
or events to prove the facts stated therein, if 
the judge finds that they were made in the reg;:i°lar 
course of a business, at or about the time of the 
act, condition or event recorded and that the 
sources of information from which made 3nd the 
method and circumstances of the preparation were such 
as to indicate their trustworthiness. emphasis 
added. 
- 7 -
The reasoning of the trial court 1n .1dmitting thP writing 
in question into evidence was that it hJd been received by 
Plaintiff in the regular course of its business. The require-
ment of Rule 63 (13) is that the writing be made by the 
the business not merely received. 
further in Point III herein. 
This distinction is discussed 
Even if this court were to determine that the language 
of Rule 63 (13) should be extended so as to include external 
business records, the writing in question would still be 
inadmissable under Rule 63 (13) for the reason that Plaintiff's 
president, Ervall Hansen, would not be competent to testify 
that the delivery ticket was made in the regular course of 
business of Metro Oil Products. Further Mr. Hasen would not 
be competent to testify as to the sources of information from 
which it was made, the method and circumstances of its 
preparation nor its trustworthiness as required by Rule 63 (13). 
Without such a competent witness the trial court could in no way 
meet its obligation under Rule 63 (13), and could not allow 
such a writing into evidence over the objection of Defendant. 
Further, the reasoning that Plaintiff received this writing in 
the regular course of its business certainly does not meet the 
requirement of trustworthiness under Rule 63 (13). 
- 8 -
lii_cih cases dealing with the business record exception to 
the rule have dealt only with internal records i.e., 
prepared by an agent or employee within the business entity 
seeking to introduce them, Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft co., 622 
P. 2d 1168 (Utah 1980); Gull Laboratories Inc. v. Louis A. 
Buserco, 589 P.2d 756 (Utah 1978); Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 
P. 2d 1286 (Utah 1976) 
POINT III 
IT IS INEQUITABLE TO ALLOW EXTERNAL BUSINESS 
RECORDS TO BE ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE UNDER THE 
BUSINESS RECORD EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE. 
The justification and reasoning of the business record 
exception to the hearsay rule is that documents which have been 
made simultaneously with events and transactions and which 
memorialize those events and transactions may be used to 
introduce those events and transactions into evidence where 
various individuals would otherwise have to be called to testify 
and to recall possibly numerous and complex facts. Further the 
individual introducing such exhibits may give foundational 
testimony as to their origin i.e., by whom prepared, the manner 
in which they were prepared and safeguards as to accuracy, much 
- 9 -
as Plaintiff's president did in this with respect 
Plaintiff's internal invoices. llowev,.,1 when externa 1 records 
are allowed into evidence as exhibits, the opposing party is 
afforded no opportunity to inquire as to their origin, by whom 
prepared and what steps were taken to insure their accuracy. 
To do so denies the opposing party any right to challenge the 
relevancy, compentency and truthfullness of any such documents 
through cross-examination. Such documents are clearly unsworn 
statements made out of court by some third party and the mere 
fact that they were said to have been received by the proffering 
party in the regular course of business is no justification 
for denying the opposing party the rights set forth above. 
POINT IV 
FAILURE TO EXCLUDE EXTERNAL BUSINESS RECORDS IS 
NOT HARMLESS ERROR IN THIS CASE. 
The only issue involved in this case is whether or not the 
merchandise in question was actually delivered. The delivery 
ticket prepared by Metro Oil Products is the only proof that 
Plaintiff offered as to actual delivery. In fact Plaintiff's 
president bases his own recollection upon this writing. If this 
exhibit is excluded from evidence, Plaintiff has no direct 
- 10 -
vvidence thQt the petroleum products were ever delivered to 
Defendant. Therefore, improper admission into evidence of this 
exhibit can hardly be considered harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
This entire case revolves around a single exhibit and issue. 
The so called delivery ticket purports to evidence that 
Defmdant received merchandise from Plaintiff which he did not 
pay for. This ticket does not comprise a portion of the business 
records made by the Plaintiff in the regular course of business 
but rather by a completely distinct and separate business 
entity, who was neither a party to this action nor called 
to testify at trial. Defendant was denied any opportunity to 
question or challenge the relevancy, compentancy or truthfull-
ness of this exhibit through cross-examination. For these 
reasons and for others set forth herein Defendant-Appellant 
respectfully requests that this court reverse the decision 
of the District court and remand this case for re-trial of 
the properly admitted evidence. 
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DATED this day of May, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
I, 
(_.\,,, /_)ll',1 ;IPJ<," 
DALE M. DORIUS 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
P. 0. Box "U" 
29 south Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
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